




In the last few chapters we have looked at the first stages in a process toward establishing 
trust between systems. First, the establishment of roots of trust and the measured boot 
components; and second, the collection of evidence throughout the measurement 
process. We reviewed the different roots of trust in a compute platform—namely, the 
RTM, RTS, and RTR—and how the measured boot process (S-RTM and D-RTM) uses 
the RTM to measure and store the evidence in the RTS. The next stage in this process 
is the presentation of this evidence through attestation protocols and appraisal of the 
evidence that asserts the integrity of a platform. This stage is referred to as attestation and 
verification in this book, and it is our objective for this chapter.
We introduce the concept of attestation in this chapter, along with an attestation 
framework that defines a logical view of the assertion layers leading to attestation of specific 
target entities or components. The attestation provides evidence of trust and can include 
any device or target system participating in the trust chain. Additionally, the chapter covers 
one commercial implementation of the attestation solution authored by Intel and security 
management independent software vendors, code-named Mt. Wilson. We provide details 
about the solution architecture, attestation application programming interfaces (APIs), 
integration of these APIs into a security management function, and workload orchestration 
tools for decision making. We hope application developers and security specialists will gain 
a solid understanding of the inner workings of attestation solutions to the level of being able 
to carry out integration projects and even extend the paradigm.
Attestation
Attestation is a critical component for trusted computing environments, providing an 
essential proof of trustability and the means for conducting audits for target computing 
devices. That is, attestation allows a program or platform to authenticate itself. Remote 
attestation is a means for a system to make reliable statements about the pre-launch and 
launch components in a distributed system. A remote party can then make authorization 
decisions based on that information. The concept of attestation is still evolving, and 
hence the research community has not reached a common understanding of what it 
CHAPTER 4 ■ ATTEsTATion: PRoving TRusTAbiliTy
66
means. However, here is a practical definition for the purpose of working with trusted 
clouds. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) defines attestation as:
The process of vouching for the accuracy of information. External entities 
can attest to shielded locations, protected capabilities, and Roots of 
Trust. A platform can attest to its description of platform characteristics 
that affect the integrity (trustworthiness) of a platform. Both forms of 
attestation require reliable evidence of the attesting entity.
There are two properties that have to be addressed to assert this trust.
1. Measurement properties. Includes the degree of completeness 
for measuring the launch and running state of the targeted 
device or system, and the freshness of the measurements—
that is, how recent the measurements are.
2. Attestation properties. Includes the authenticity of the 
evidence to the decision process, and a measure of semantic 
explicitness describing the appropriateness of the evidence to 
the decision-making process.
These two properties help us classify the remote attestation techniques. Most of the 
existing remote attestation techniques can be categorized into one of the two types.
•	 Static remote attestation techniques rely on the signatures or 
hashes of the firmware and binaries for determining the integrity 
of the platform state. Static remote attestation can’t be extended 
to measure the behavior of a platform. Furthermore, even if the 
hash of the boot state (static state) does not reveal any tampering, 
it does not follow that the run-time behavior of the application 
will be trustworthy.
•	 Dynamic remote attestation techniques use monitoring instead 
of measuring the application binary. Dynamic remote attestation 
techniques are relatively difficult to integrate into existing 
operating systems and software applications, because there is 
no unequivocal reference point; that is, there is no commonly 
agreed upon definition of what constitutes trustworthy behavior 
in an operating system, virtual machine monitor, or application. 
Benchmarks for trustworthy behavior, defined in existing remote 
attestation techniques, are either vague or incomplete, with only 
a portion of the activities performed by an application during 
its execution monitored. The benchmarks don’t apply to virtual 
machine monitors because the benchmark requirements are not 
yet well understood.
Both static and dynamic remote attestation are relevant to virtualization and cloud 
computing. As described in the previous chapters, the trusted compute pool uses models 
that begin with the boot integrity of the platform, asserted with the static attestation 
techniques. Meanwhile, asserting run-time integrity needs dynamic attestation 
techniques. Static attestation techniques are beginning to be adopted in practical cloud 
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computing deployments. The static techniques provide a good foundation toward 
reaching a trusted infrastructure. Dynamic remote attestation is complementary and 
brings significant value by enforcing security; hence, we can expect a strong drive for 
adoption. However, in order to achieve the vision and goals of a trusted infrastructure,  
it is an imperative to have a dynamic remote attestation facility in working order.
For context, we provide a brief overview in this chapter of remote attestation 
techniques discussed in the research community, including reference implementations 
where available. Please note that, other than Integrity Measurement Architecture, none  
of the schemes has seen wide adoption, if any at all.
Integrity Measurement Architecture
Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) is a classic static remote attestation model 
developed by IBM1 for measurement and reporting of the integrity of Linux-based 
systems. It takes a hash of the binaries of the software code that run on any system, and 
compares them against known-good hashes to assert that the system is high integrity. 
IMA extends the trusted boot process of the TCG beyond the bootstrapping of the 
Linux loader, to the chain of trust from the TPM, to applications running on the system. 
Through extensions to the kernel of the Linux system, IMA measures the code that’s 
loaded into memory for execution by taking a SHA-1 hash of the code prior to that 
execution. A measurement archive is maintained for measurements previously taken.
Integrity Measurement Architecture was the first practical implementation of a 
TCG-based remote attestation technique. It allows a challenger to verify a platform 
status by measuring the executables running on that platform. IMA forms the basis for 
many remote attestation techniques that followed the original implementation. The 
requirement for using IMA is to download a kernel patch from IBM. The prototype of 
IMA was implemented as a Linux Security Module on RedHat 9.0 Linux distribution and 
kernel version 2.6.5.
Policy Reduced Integrity Measurement Architecture
Policy Reduced Integrity Measurement Architecture (PRIMA) is a variation of IMA. 
According to the authors of this architecture,2 the static code and load-time measurement 
cannot be used to assess the run-time behavior. This architecture introduces the concept 
of measured security context or label of the subject, in addition to static code. The code/
data digest also includes a role field so that additional identification of subjects and 
objects can be done. This approach allows remote attestation to be made on the basis of 
secure information-flow models. The approach is rather low level and cannot be used 
for distributed services in an organization or the information flows that occur within the 
organization and in outside world. There are no known implementations in a commonly 
available operating system environment.
1See http://researcher.watson.ibm.com/researcher/files/us-msteiner/ima.sailer_
usenix_security_2004_slides.pdf
2Trent Jaeger et al., “PRIMA: PolicyReduced Integrity Measurement Architecture, SACMAT2006, 
June 7–9, 2006, Lake Tahoe, California. ACM 1 59593 354 9/06/0006.
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Semantic Remote Attestation
Semantic Remote Attestation is an attempt at creating a platform-independent remote 
attestation technique.3 The core idea is that of a trusted virtual machine (TVM) capable 
of enforcing the requirements for those applications running within this virtual 
machine. The model establishes trust on the TVM and uses this trust to enforce security 
requirements. It attempts to measure the behavior of the code running inside a trusted 
virtual machine. The architecture is an incremental improvement over the original 
remote attestation techniques and is more flexible compared with binary attestation 
techniques with regard to expressiveness. This model of attestation has not been 
implemented, or at least published, owing to the complexity of defining and analyzing the 
notion of trust.
The Attestation Process
Given the discussion in the above section about the state and maturity of attestation 
techniques, let’s look at the details of the static attestation protocol and the overall 
integrity measurement flow.
The integrity measurement flow describes the steps required to measure the 
platform integrity measurements. It includes:
A means of generating and collecting the measurements through •	
an RTM.
A means of storing the measurements that is either tamper •	
resistant or tamper evident, with a TPM for RTS and RTR.
A means of conveying the measurements to a challenger via the •	
attestation agents, as described in the attestation protocol below.
A means of analyzing the measured result, and a means of •	
asserting the trustability of the machine based on the results of 
that determination through a trust assessment authority or trust 
attestation authority (TAA).
Remote Attestation Protocol
Figure 4-1 illustrates the attestation protocol providing the means for conveying 
measurements to the challenger. The endpoint attesting device must have a means of 
measuring the BIOS firmware, low-level device drivers, operating system, virtual machine 
monitor components, and be able to forward those measurements to the attestation 
authority. The attesting device must do this while protecting the integrity, authenticity, 
nonrepudiation, and some cases, the confidentiality of those measurements.
3Vivek Haldar et al., Semantic Remote Attestation: a Virtual Machine Directed Approach to Trusted 
Computing, VM2004 Proceedings of the 3rd conference on Virtual Machine Research and Technology 
Symposium, vol. 3 (Berkeley, CA: USENIX Association).






































   




















a. Ver (Sig      (PCR, NC), AIK) = true / false 
AIK                                pub
b. , c.  Compare (PCR, SML == Golden Measurements)
Figure 4-1. Remote attestation protocol
Let’s walk through the steps of the remote attestation protocol:
1. The challenger, at the request of a requester, creates a 
nonpredictable nonce (NC) and sends it to the attestation 
agent on the attesting node, along with the selected list of 
platform configuration registers (PCRs).
2. The attestation agent sends that request to the TPM as a 
TPMQuote request with the nonce, and the PCR list.
3. In reponse to the TPMQuote request, the TPM loads the 
attestation identity key from protected storage in the TPM 
by using the storage root key (SRK), performs a TPM Quote 
command, which is used to sign the selected PCRs and 
the provided nonce (NC) with the private key, AIKpriv. 
Additionally, the attesting agent retrieves the stored 
measurement log (SML).
4. Called the integrity response, the attesting agent sends the 
response consisting of the signed quote, signed nonce (NC), 
and the SML to the challenger. The attesting agent also 
delivers the AIK credential, which consists of the AIKpub that 
was signed by a privacy CA.
5. The challenger validates if the AIK credential was signed by 
a trusted privacy CA thus belonging to a genuine TPM. The 
challenger also verifies whether AIKpub is still valid by checking 
the certificate revocation list of the trusted issuing party.
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6. The challenger verifies the signature of the quote and checks 
the freshness of the quote.
7. Based on the received stored measurement log and the PCR 
values, the challenger processes the SML, compares the 
individual module hashes that are extended to the PCRs 
against the known-good or golden values, and recomputes 
the received PCR values. If the individual values match the 
golden values, and if the computed values match the signed 
aggregate, the remote node is asserted to be in a trusted state.
This protocol is highly resistant to replay attacks, tampering, and masquerading.
How does this remote attestation protocol get implemented and manifested in an IT 
environment? Figure 4-2 illustrates a sample IT architecture supporting the generation, 
forwarding, and analysis of platform boot integrity measurements, as well as assertion of the 
trustability of the attestation at each decision point via a trust assertion authority, or TAA. These 





















Figure 4-2. Trust attestation authority
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Flow for Integrity Measurement
In assessing the measurements, the TAA references a set of properties. These properties 
represent attributes and measurements for the BIOS and the operating system and virtual 
machine monitors. These measurements are referred to as golden measurements or 
whitelists, and are:
Provided and verified and validated through certificates by the •	
original equipment manufacturer (OEM))
Provided and vouched for by an ISV Service•	
Collected by an authenticated administrator on first boot in an •	
isolated or enclave type of environment
The process for carrying out the integrity measurement and verification is as follows:
1. When a new instance of a BIOS or an operating system or 
virtual machine monitor is made available, an initial set of 
trusted measurements (golden measurements) is taken on the 
image. These measurements are provided either through third 
parties such as an OEM, operating system, virtual machine 
monitor supplier, or through a trusted whitelist service 
provider to the trust authority, It may also be generated at 
initial provisioning by system administrators.
2. An RTM such as Intel TXT is used to take the measurement of 
the software components during server or device boot.
3. The measurements are stored in the TPM. A log from which 
the measurements can be reconstructed is stored in memory 
for transmission to the verifier to allow reconstruction of the 
measurements.
4. The TAA generates an authenticated request for 
measurements from the server/device, in response to an 
action by any requester, or the endpoint device requesting a 
service. This action follows the attestation protocol previously 
described. The trust agent receives this request and passes 
it to the TPM to obtain a TPMQuote for the requested PCR 
measurments. TPMQuote, along with the measurement log, 
are packaged as an integrity report, using the TCG Integrity 
Reporting Schema.
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5. The trust agent transmits the data to the TAA’s verifier. The 
TAA verifies the signature over the hashes by inspecting both 
the public key used to sign them and the signature itself, 
which will ensure that the nonce sent to the trust agent is the 
same one as the one used in the TPMQuote. It then compares 
those signed measurements with the golden measurements 
obtained earlier. There is more than a simple comparison. 
Depending upon the sophistication of the verifier, it can 
use the system measurement log (SML) to re-compute the 
aggregate measurements from the individual measurements, 
and then verify them against the golden measurements.
6. The results of the comparison, collated with other such 
comparisons from other machines and digitally signed, may 
be displayed via a user interface, such as a management 
console or dashboard, to the administrator or it can be 
provided through an API to an automated enforcement, policy 
engines, and orchestrators. Solutions use the results to apply, 
manage, enforce, and report on the trust level of the systems.
A First Commercial Attestation Implementation: 
The Intel Trust Attestation Platform
To provide a path toward broad use of trusted compute pools and to exemplify the vision 
of trusted infrastructure and cloud computing, Intel developed a remote attestation 
solution capable of working across a broad range of hardware and operating system and 
virtual machine monitor platforms: the Intel Trust Attestation Platform (TAP). The goals 
of the Intel Trust Attestation Platform are threefold:
Provide a production-quality implementation of remote •	
attestation and a trust assessment authority capable of providing 
verification and assessment across a broad range of devices. The 
Intel Trust Attestation Platform features high availability and 
security of the attestation platform and its interfaces.
Provide stable and simplistic northbound and southbound •	
application programming interfaces (APIs) for attestation 
information requesters, and for interfacing with different sources 
of integrity measurements. These are trust APIs, designed to 
encourage multiple interoperable attestation solutions from a 
variety of security-management independent software vendors. 
The interoperability and diversity minimize the occurrence of 
vendor lock-in.
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Develop the attestation platform as a true extensible and •	
pluggable framework providing fertile ground for the deployment 
of innovative third-party attestation techniques and models. 
Initially, the solution supports a TPM-based static attestation 
model, and is already being extended to support dynamic 
attestation techniques for asserting the boot integrity of virtual 
machines, as well as the run-time integrity of operating systems 
and hypervisors.
Figure 4-3 captures the high-level architecture of the Intel Trust Attestation Platform. 
Consistent with the cloud approach, the Intel Trust Attestation Platform features a loosely 
coupled architecture with a flexible software backplane and fabric with core capabilities 
and services, including a set of slots to plug in various attestation blades for different 
types of attestation provided by Intel and third-party independent software vendors. Here 


















































Figure 4-3. Intel Trust Attestation Platform
An •	 API layer acting as primary interface for:
• Endpoint devices needing to carry out an attestation before a 
request for services
• Entities requesting integrity verification for policy 
enforcement and visibility into the trust of the infrastructure
• Access to compliance and security monitoring tools
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A •	 common services layer for the attestation service and platform 
to enable authentication, authorization, and access control (AAA) 
for the API calls, and a flexible and extensible data model for the 
attestation platform repository accessible via APIs.
An •	 attestation blade supporting a variety of attestation types 
implemented as plug-ins. The attestation blade is an element 
of a set of pluggable components integrated into the attestation 
platform taking advantage of the fabric and core functionality of 
the platform, including interfaces, security, and common services. 
As shown in Figure 4-3, each blade has two distinct components:
• A measurement and attestation agent capable of collecting 
measurements from an endpoint device or server.
• A verification module that uses the attestation platform 
services, and provides custom verification logic for an 
attestation capability instance, using the northbound APIs 
of the attestation platform, thereby exposing an assertion 
function and making it available to policy enforcers and 
other requesting entities.
Mt. Wilson Platform
Mt. Wilson is the code name for the Intel Trust Attestation platform that has the TPM-
based boot attestation functionality. It is the first attestation blade that was released as 
part of the attestation platform. Mt. Wilson provides a secure mechanism for customers 
and data center operators to attest the integrity of Intel-based systems enabled with 
Intel’s Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) for RTM, along with third-party trusted 
platform modules (TPMs). The TPM stores and reports the platform measurements, 
including BIOS firmware and hypervisor software on servers. The architecture of the 
blade, described in more detail later in this chapter, is applicable to any TPM-based 
integrity measurement and reporting architecture.
We have assembled proof of existence working prototypes of a boot integrity 
attestation blade with Microsoft Windows 8, and corresponding TPM using a BIOS boot 
block as the RTM. We also have constructed a proof point with Citrix XenClient XT using 
Intel TXT on the client. A subset of the Mt. Wilson functionality has been shared with the 
open-source community under the name Open Attestation (OAT).
Mt. Wilson is a fast-evolving platform with new features and capabilities developed 
and released as the community gains experience with the technology. Here is a snapshot 
of key capabilities in the current Mt. Wilson solution.
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Table 4-1. Mt. Wilson Key Capabilities
Attestation Support PCR and module-based attestation and verification for 
VMware ESXi 5.1 and above, and for Xen, KVM with 
RHEL, SuSE, and Ubuntu Linux
APIs REST interfaces for query, reporting, management, and 
provisioning functions;
REST interfaces for whitelist definition and management
Security Digest-style API authentication and validation using RSA 
keys (<signed http authorization header >)
SAML-based API responses with signed SAML assertions
SSL communication and mutual authentication of 
communication endpoints
Auditability Secure logging of requests, responses, transactions 
for auditability, forensics including logging APIs, and 
support for CEF format for consumption into SIEM tools
Deployability Automated installation of host trust agents and all 
Mt.Wilson components
Solution validation with Hewlett Packard, Dell, Cisco 
hardware, etc.
Availability Deployed as Xen/KVM/VMW, virtual machines 
including high availability and fault tolerance for key 
components for VMware
Automation and Productivity 
Tools
API client: utility wrapper code for API invocation and 
response processing
Reference integration with OpenStack extensions to 
flavors, dashboard, scheduler
Reference trust dashboard with API integration with  
Mt. Wilson
The rest of this chapter will provide a comprehensive view of this attestation blade, 
starting with the architecture and design components to support server operating 
systems and virtual machine monitors, followed by the core attestation related API 
definitions and security considerations. Sample source code examples are provided in the 
last section of this chapter to show how to:
Register the servers with Mt. Wilson•	
Request the trust assertions (using the trust APIs)•	
Whitelist the golden measurements that are used in the appraisal •	
and verification
CHAPTER 4 ■ ATTEsTATion: PRoving TRusTAbiliTy
76
Mt. Wilson Architecture
Mt. Wilson, as shown in Figure 4-4, has two main components: the trust agent (TA) and 
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Figure 4-4. Mt. Wilson architecture
The trust agent runs on the device or host that is attesting with the trust attestation 
authority. The trust agent is the collector, and securely uploads the integrity measurements 
(fetched using the TPMQuote command) and the integrity event log from the TPM. The 
trust agent is not required in a VMWare environment, since vCenter provides specific APIs 
(called TrustAttestationReport) and capabilities that provide the functionality. More 
specifically, vCenter Agent and VMWare vCenter Server enable the necessary handshake, 
verification of the platform certificates, and invocation of the TPM commands, in response 
to any entity invoking the TrustAttestationReport web services API.
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The trust attestation authority is the core attestation and assessor with a number of 
key services:
•	 Attestation Server: This is the primary service providing the 
APIs for the trust attestation authority. It has the function of 
interfacing with the attesting hosts, requesting the specific host 
for its measurements following the remote attestation protocol, 
and verifying certificates, signatures, and logs requests and 
responses for tracking and auditability. A key role of the attesation 
server is to appraise the measurements from the device/host, 
which involves comparing these measurements against golden 
measurements, whitelists, and known-good values. The whitelists 
are the final TPM PCR extensions for each of the PCRs of the TPM 
and granular SHA-1 hashes of the various loadable modules of 
the measured launch environment (MLE). The appraisal includes 
verifying the individual module hashes from the SML (event log) 
against the whitelists of the module hashes and recomputing the 
PCR values from the event log entries. The recomputed PCR value 
has to match the value sent from the device (which shows that the 
log is not compromised) and match the whitelist/known-good. In 
today’s implementation across hypervisor and operating system 
vendors, there are variations in approaches to measuring the 
TCB. For instance, VMware has made great strides in measuring 
a high percentage of their TCB. Open-source operating system 
and hypervisor providers have, for the most part, reused the Intel 
reference tboot implementation, and consequently measure a 
small part of the TCB, mostly the kernels. As the need for trust 
increases in the cloud data centers, vendors have been expressing 
a willingness to broaden the amount of measured TCB.
•	 Whitelist Management: This service provides APIs to define the 
various MLEs in the environment, their attributes, policy-driven 
trust definition, and the whitelists for the modules or PCRs. 
Whitelist measurements are usually retrieved from hosts built and 
configured in an isolated environment/enclave, or provided by 
the OEM and VMV/OS vendors. The MLEs and the corresponding 
whitelist measurements need to be configured to specific versions 
of BIOS and hypervisor.
•	 Host Management: This service provides APIs to register the 
hosts to be attested with the system. For successful attestation, the 
whitelists for the BIOS and hypervisor running on the host need 
to be preconfigured in the Mt. Wilson system, prior to registration 
of the host that would attest.
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•	 Privacy CA: Provides the attestation certificate for the open-
source hypervisor hosts and validation of the same. The certificate 
authority needs to support the OCSP protocol for certificate 
validation. This capability is subsumed by VMware vCenter Server 
in the VMWare environment. Management of Citrix XenServer 
does not need privacy CA since it supports direct anonymous 
attestation (DAA).
In the next section, we drill into the attestation server and understand the functions 
and the attestation process flows.
The Mt. Wilson Attestation Process
Figure 4-5 illustrates the attestation architecture in Mt. Wilson, with a drilldown of the 
attestation server component described in the previous session and depicted in Figure 4-4. 
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Figure 4-5. The Mt. Wilson attestation architecture
1. Provisioning the attestation identity keys (AIKs) and ensuring 
successful validation of the host
2. Registration of the host with Mt. Wilson
3. Actual attestation request and response
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Attestation Identity Key Provisioning
The attestation identity key provisioning process is done in four steps.
1. TPM on the host is validated. According to the TCG 
specifications, compliant systems should contain an 
endorsement credential and a platform credential. These two 
credentials are installed by the OEM to certify that the TPM’s 
endorsement key and the entire TCG subsystem are genuine. 
However, in practice these credentials are often missing. As a 
workaround, system administrators may inspect a system and 
generate equivalent credentials locally after being satisfied 
that the system is genuine. The trust agent software provides 
a password-protected mechanism in conjunction with the 
privacy CA service for the system administrator to easily 
generate and install the equivalent credentials. Additional 
credentials, known as the conformance credential and 
validation credential, are also possible but are seen even less 
in practice, and are not covered during the attestation identity 
key provisioning and host registration.
2. The AIK is created by the platform and certified by the privacy CA. 
This transforms the platform verification problem into an RSA 
encryption problem. It is critical for the system administrator 
to conduct an adequate inspection to ensure that the TPM is 
genuine and that Intel TXT is properly enabled on platforms 
that are missing the endorsement credential and the platform 
credential because, once the AIK is certified by the privacy CA, 
remote attestation services will trust TPM quotes signed with the 
corresponding AIK private key. The AIK certificate is imported 
into Mt. Wilson when the host is registered.
3. An RSA key pair and transport layer security (TLS) certificate 
are generated. These are for the trust agent to use for 
incoming attestation requests. Mt. Wilson provides a 
mechanism to import the trust agent TLS certificate on a 
per-host basis and verifies all attestation connections to that 
host using the same certificate.
4. A second RSA key pair and TLS certificate are generated on 
the platform. The private key bound to the TPM and the 
TLS certificate indicates the specifics of the TPM binding. 
This key pair facilitates applications of the trusted compute 
pool relying on attestation of the platform to authorize 
certain actions by providing a mechanism assure a third 
party that, when it connects to the attested platform, it is the 
same platform in the same trusted state as was attested. Mt. 
Wilson provides a mechanism to import the bound or sealed 
TLS certificate after a host is registered and to provide that 
certificate to its clients.
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Host Registration and Attestation Identity Key Certificate 
Provisioning
Figure 4-6 depicts the sequence diagram showing the steps for host registration and the 
management of attestation identity key certificates. As mentioned earlier, these steps are 
applicable only for hosts running on Xen or KVM.
Attestation 
Server








Encrypt EC & AIK w/  PCA  AIk Signing  Key (pub)
Generate Identity
Decrypt  for EC & AIK
Verify EC with MTW EK 
Signing Key (prv)
Generate AIK Cert; signed with 




AIK Certificate over SSL
Register Host and
AIK Certificate in DB
Status
Figure 4-6. Flow of authority identity key certificate provisioning
The host registration process begins with an API request to •	
the attestation server. This request may come from a system 
administrator using a management portal, or from an automated 
system in charge of managing hosts in the data center.
The attestation server sends an attestation identity key •	
provisioning request to the trust agent on the host using a TLS 
connection secured by the trust agent TLS certificate.
The trust agent uses the TPM to create a new AIK private and •	
public key pair. It sends the AIK public key and the endorsement 
credential to the privacy CA, encrypted using the privacy CA’s 
public key to ensure privacy.
The privacy CA decrypts the AIK public key and endorsement •	
credential using its private key. It then generates a random 
challenge and encrypts it using the public key certified by the 
endorsement credential. It sends this challenge to the host.
The host decrypts the challenge using the endorsement key, •	
a private key corresponding to the endorsement credential. It 
re-encrypts the challenge using the privacy CA’s public key for 
privacy and sends the re-encrypted challenge to the privacy CA.
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The privacy CA decrypts the challenge to verify it is correct, then •	
certifies the host’s AIK public key. The privacy CA sends the AIK 
certificate to the host, encrypted using the public key in the host’s 
endorsement credential.
The host decrypts the AIK certificate using its endorsement key.•	
The host sends the AIK certificate to the attestation server over •	
the trust agent TLS connection.
The attestation server registers the host and stores the AIK •	
certificate in the database.
The attestation server responds to the system administrator •	
or automated system, indicating the success or failure of the 
registration process.
Requesting Platform Trust
This is the invocation of the trust APIs by an entity requesting trust information. The 
API request is authenticated and the input parameters are validated and then handed 
to the appraiser component of the attestation server. The appraiser follows the remote 
attestation protocol to challenge the platform for the integrity measurements. Once 
the verification is done, Mt. Wilson summarizes all these steps by generating a SAML 
assertion of the platform compliance with its trust policy. Details of the SAML assertion 
and the security and integrity of the exchange are covered later in this chapter.
Security of Mt. Wilson
Security is integral to the Mt. Wilson platform. The ultimate objective of an adversary of 
Mt. Wilson would be to subvert and control the outcome of the attestation by:
Spoofing the trust agent to attain a fake TPM quote•	
Compromising the Mt. Wilson attestation server to subvert signed •	
content
Spoofing the Mt. Wilson attestation server to fake a signed content•	
Hacking the whitelists•	
Compromising the data on the network and repositories•	
Figure 4-7 shows the threat model considered during the design of Mt. Wilson, 
with articulation of the consequences when the adversary accomplishes the attack and 
possible mitigations implemented. We summarize the mitigating actions against the 
threats listed above.
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Figure 4-7. Mt. Wilson threat analysis
Registered API client calls (signed with their private key) •	
can be verified by the Mt. Wilson attestation server using the 
corresponding public key. These keys get generated and stored 
by the API client during the registration process. Users are 
encouraged to secure their private keys using a password-based 
mechanism, at minimum. The Mt. Wilson Java API Client Library 
includes convenient functions for this purpose, using the Java Key 
store format to secure the private keys.
CHAPTER 4 ■ ATTEsTATion: PRoving TRusTAbiliTy
83
The communication channels between the hosts and the users •	
are encrypted using SSL. When a new user registers with Mt. 
Wilson, the Mt. Wilson SSL TLS certificate is verified and stored by 
the user to secure subsequent communication between the user 
and Mt. Wilson. The trust agent stores its SSL TLS certificate with 
Mt. Wilson upon registration of a new host to secure all future 
communication between Mt. Wilson and the trust agent.
Trust agents store their TLS private keys in a password-protected •	
Java Keystore file.
Users are allowed to call into APIs based on their existing roles. •	
Users request roles during registration with Mt. Wilson and these 
are approved by the Mt. Wilson administrator.
The attestation status of the hosts is returned as signed SAML •	
assertions that can be verified by the end consumer. The  
Mt. Wilson SAML certificate is stored by users when they register 
with Mt. Wilson in order to later verify SAML assertions.
A public and private key pair is the preferred authentication •	
mechanism for management of the whitelist and host trust 
policies.
Mt. Wilson Trust, Whitelisting, and  
Management APIs
Mt. Wilson provides a rich set of APIs for all interactions with it. In fact, the primary 
communication with the Mt. Wilson attestation authority is via authenticated APIs. There 
are five categories of APIs:
1. Provisioning APIs, for registering hosts and requesting AIKs.
2. Query APIs, the trust APIs that requesting entities (requesters/
API clients) invoke to get a trust assertion.
3. Reporting APIs, providing details about hosts registered with 
Mt. Wilson, including the current measurements and the 
whitelists.
4. Automation APIs, allowing an administrator to easily register 
all hosts within a VMware cluster or create an MLE using a 
known-good host in a trusted environment.
5. Management APIs, enabling registering users, managing 
their authorized roles, and downloading various certificates 
managed by Mt. Wilson.
Calls to the API must be sent over SSL TLS. All APIs are REST-based. Mt. Wilson APIs 
use a client-server model without third-party intervention to provide authentication. The 
authentication model is very similar to OAuth 1.0 and HTTP Digest, and it provides a 
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stateless scheme for use with clusters and load balancers. However, it does not work with 
URL-rewriting proxies because the URL is covered by the client’s signature. Every API 
client—that is, any entity invoking the APIs, such as portals, schedulers, other subsystems 
or policy engines—needs two RSA keys, as follows:
•	 API signing key. The public portion of the API signing key is stored 
in the Mt. Wilson keystore. The API client retains the private 
portion of this key in an encrypted and secure keystore
•	 SAML assertion validation key. This is the public portion of the 
Mt. Wilson SAML signing key and is stored with the API client
An API client registers with Mt.Wilson via a credential •	
management server to acquire the RSA keys. A Mt.Wilson 
instance can register a number of API clients.
Mt. Wilson APIs
Figures 4-8 and 4-9 show the core APIs for the Mt. Wilson provisioning and trust query 
API and the management and whitelisting API.
Figure 4-8. Provisioning and trust query API
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To facilitate interoperability, consistency, and seamless integration, we expect the 
industry to converge toward a standardized set of APIs related to attestation. We offer 
these as a starting point for the industry to help drive interoperability across different 
attestation solution implementations.
The API Request Specification
All API calls are http requests with one required header: “Authorization: X509 
<authentication-info>”. Any unauthorized request is challenged with a standard 
header: “WWW-Authenticate: X509 <challenge-info>”.
Each API request includes the following parameters:
Fingerprint (base64-encoded SHA-256 digest of the client API •	
certificate)
Signature method (RSA-SHA256)•	
Time stamp from standard http Date header (RFC 822 date •	
format)
Client nonce (base64-encoded) in http X-Nonce header•	
http request method•	
Signature over the above and also:•	
Figure 4-9. Management and whitelisting API
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• Original request URL including query string
• http message body (required, use empty string if not 
applicable)
• Any other custom headers specified besides Date and 
X-Nonce in the “headers” field of the Authorization line, in 
the order specified
• Signature created using client’s RSA private key, and it is 
base64-encoded
Strongest method is RSA-SHA256•	











Date: Sun, 06 Nov 1994 08:49:37 GMT
Figure 4-10. API request including authentication
API Response
Mt. Wilson asserts all API responses. Responses are signed SAML assertions. Assertions 
are signed with the Mt.Wilson RSA SAML signing key. There is one SAML signing key for 
each installation of Mt.Wilson. An API client validates the signature with the SAML public 
key and uses the trust information. Here is an example of an API invocation with a SAML 
assertion. This Java example uses the Apache HttpClient library to obtain the SAML 
assertion for “192.168.1.121” by sending a GET request to Mt. Wilson:
 
ApiClient api = KeystoreUtil.clientForUserInDirectory(directory, username, 
password, server);
String samlForHost = api.getSamlForHost(new Hostname("192.168.1.121"));
 
Here’s how to interpret the SAML response:
 
TrustAssertion trustAssertion = api.verifyTrustAssertion(samlForHost);
if( trustAssertion.isValid() )
        for(String attr : trustAssertion.getAttributeNames())
                System.out.println("Attr: "+attr+":"+trustAssertion.
getStringAttribute(attr));
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Attributes for subject’s trust status in the SAML response are:
•	 Trusted: True if both Trusted_BIOS and Trusted_VMM are true.
•	 Trusted_BIOS: True if the BIOS measurements on the subject 
match the whitelist (known-good values)
•	 Trusted_VMM: True if the VMM measurements on the subject 
match the whitelist (known-good values)
Attributes for subject’s measured launch environment in the SAML response are:
 
BIOS_Name, BIOS_Version, BIOS_OEM, VMM_Name, VMM_Version, VMM_OSName, VMM_OSVersion 
Mt. Wilson API Usage
There are two options for the requesters of attestation information to call into  
Mt. Wilson APIs. A direct invocation of the REST APIs is the most basic approach to 
use and integrate with Mt. Wilson. The user is required to implement the complete API 
request specifications. This would mean pre-processing the creation and handling of keys 
and authentication, and post-processing of information for a successful API invocation, 
and the correct processing of the responses. An API toolkit (called API Client Library) is 
available to simplify the invocation of the APIs, with bindings for different languages like 
Java, C#, and Python. This toolkit encapsulates multiple API calls, creation and handling 
of RSA keys and certificates, and authentication and processing of API responses (which 
are SAML signed assertions). Using this toolkit, the users can make Java (or C# or Python) 
function calls to communicate with the system. The sample code and examples that are 
used in this chapter use the Java binding of the API toolkit.
There are three different options for the .jar file:
1. Zip file containing the api-client .jar and related dependencies
2. Single .jar with dependencies
3. Single .jar with dependencies shaded to prevent conflicts with 
other libraries
Deploying Mt. Wilson
There are multiple models for deploying attestation components in a data center. Ideally, 
attestation is transparent to applications, carrying its function quietly in the background. 
In practice, it’s far from that. How unobtrusive attestation technology is depends upon 
the deployment method. Some of the possible models include:
Dedicated virtual appliances•	
Dedicated physical appliances•	
Integrated as a function in security application software•	
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Integrated in cloud and virtualization management software•	
Offered as a component of a cloud service•	
Integrated as a attestation of a service•	
Mt. Wilson is delivered today as a virtual appliance, and it is being integrated 
into security software applications such as HyTrust’s Cloud Control, as well as cloud 
management software such as Virtustream’s xStream. An initial approach for adoption 
is to package and deliver Mt. Wilson software as a separate appliance with cloud 
management and security management independent software vendor offerings. As the 
usage and experiences increase with increased design and development of attestation-
based solutions, other models with tighter integration will become possible.
As attestation APIs become standardized and integral to the interactions and 
operations of a trusted cloud infrastructure, there is opportunity for providing value-
added services on top of the core attestation APIs. This could lead security management 
and cloud service providers to offer attestation as a service, with granular control to the 
usage and evolution of the APIs.
Mt. Wilson Programming Examples
In this section, we look at how to invoke the attestation APIs to get trust information 
about a server in a data center. Figure 4-11 shows the high-level steps involved in setting 
up the system and configuring it for use.
Figure 4-11. Mt. Wilson high-level programming steps
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After the installation of the Mt.Wilson server and trust agent on the hosts, required 
only for Xen or KVM hosts, users need to include the .jar file provided as part of the API 







API Client Registration Process
Before the user can make any API calls into the system, the user has to register and the 
access has to be approved. Below are steps for how to register with Mt. Wilson and how 
to make API calls after the registration has been accepted. The following code creates a 
keystore “test1.jks” in the home directory. The keystore contains an RSA keypair that is used 
to authenticate the API calls to the system. The keystore would also contain the Mt. Wilson 
SSL certificate and SAML signing certificate, which are downloaded from the server.
 
File directory = new File(System.getProperty("user.home", "."));
String username = "test1"; // you choose a username
String password = "changeit"; // you choose a password
URL server = new URL("https://mtwilson.example.com:8181"); // attestation server
String[] roles = new String[] { "Attestation", "Whitelist" };
KeystoreUtil.createUserInDirectory(directory, username, password, server, 
roles);
 
After the request is created, the user has to contact the system administrator to 
approve the access request (offline step). After the request is approved, based upon the 
roles the user has, appropriate APIs can be executed, such as maintaining a whitelist, 
adding hosts, and obtaining a trust assertion on one or more hosts.
To use the API, the user needs first to create an ApiClient object configured with 
the credentials and the attestation server. Notice that the variables directory, username, 
password, and servers are the same as what was used during registration.
 
File directory = new File(System.getProperty("user.home", "."));
String username = "test1"; // username created during registration
String password = "changeit"; // password created during registration
URL server = new URL("https://mtwilson.example.com:8181");
ApiClient apiClientObj = KeystoreUtil.clientForUserInDirectory(directory, 
username, password, server);
 
Once an APIClient object is created, the user can use that to configure whitelists and 
also to register the hosts with Mt. Wilson so that they attest when challenged.
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Whitelisting and Host Registration
Here’s some sample code for how to create a whitelist and register the host with Mt. 
Wilson—for VMware ESXi hosts:
 
TxtHostRecord gkvHostObj = new TxtHostRecord();
gkvHostObj.HostName = "hostname-in-vcenter";
gkvHostObj.AddOn_Connection_String =  
"vmware:https://vcenter.example.com:443/sdk;Username;Password";
boolean configureWhiteList = apiClientObj.configureWhiteList(gkvHostObj);
 
boolean registerHost = apiClientObj.registerHost(gkvHostObj); 
Verify Trust: Trust Attestation
Once hosts are registered with Mt Wilson, it is now possible to request a trust assertion in 
SAML format using getSamlForHost. You can verify the signature on the assertion and get 
easy access to the details using verifyTrustAssertion.
Note ■  if you are directly calling into the REsT APis, you have to implement the  
verification of the sAMl assertion using the sAMl certificate that needs to be downloaded 
explicity. The APi toolkit downloads this certificate as part of the registration itself. 
String samlForHost = apiClientObj.getSamlForHost(new Hostname("hostname-in-
vcenter"));
TrustAssertion trustAssertion = apiClientObj.verifyTrustAssertion(samlForHost);
if(trustAssertion.isValid()) {
for(String attr : trustAssertion.getAttributeNames())




As shown in this above example, using the API Client Library is a very simple way of 
using the Mt. Wilson attestation mechanism. The Mt. Wilson software is being licensed 
by many ISV and CSPs to integrate trust into the software and service offerings. More and 
more organizations are moving to clouds, and they are asking for assurance of trust of the 
platform on which their workloads are running; they are also asking the CSPs to provide 
proof of a chain of trust. The attestation solution is fast becoming a critical security 
component in the security toolset. For developers favoring a DIY approach, the open-
source OpenAttestation (OAT) is a good starting point for attestation.
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Note ■  oAT is the open-source version of Mt. Wilson code, and is provided and maintained 
by intel Corporation. you can download the documentation, code, and installation/deployment 
scripts from the oAT website.
Summary
In this chapter we covered attestation as a foundational function of trusted computing 
environments that provides proof of trustability and auditability of trust for various 
computing devices. We covered the TCG remote attestation protocol, and we described 
the vision and architecture of Intel’s Trust Attestation Platform, followed by a detailed 
look one of the first attestation solutions, called Mt. Wilson. The chapter reviewed 
the security architecture and the attestation APIs, and explained how requesters of 
trust and attestation information can invoke these APIs and process the assertions for 
decision making. There are many usages in data centers that would utilize the attestation 
information. As shown in the previous chapter, attestation is used in the creation of 
trusted compute pools and the attestation-based policy enforcement in these pools. 
Thus, attestation can be used to provide granular trust-based access control to consumer 
and BYOD devices, and the kind of services they can access within the cloud data centers. 
Attestation as a security management component will become an integral component of 
virtualization and cloud management, and it’s becoming a critical requirement in cloud 
data centers to assert the integrity and compliance of platforms and systems. ISVs and 
security management vendors may also start offering it as a SaaS offering. We believe that, 
over time, value-added capabilities will emerge around the attestation function and will 
enable monetization possibilities.
Chapter 5 will introduce a new concept and control, called hardware-assisted asset tag, 
which can be used to provide isolation, segregation, placement, and migration control of 
workload execution in multi-tenant cloud environments. Additionally, as a specialization 
of asset tags, geolocation/geo-tagging can be enabled to definitively provide increased 
visibility to the physical geolocation of the server, which may enable many controls 
that require hardware-based roots of trust to assert the location of workloads and 
data. These attributes and the associated controls are dependent on the boot integrity 
assertion of the platform; hence, they become a great adjacency to trusted compute 
pools and boot integrity.
